Happy New Babylonian Year!

This Friday: the New Year in Southern Iraq!

03/18/2008

The people of Southern Iraq are celebrating the New Year this Friday. The celebration is called “Dawrat al-Sana” or “al-Dokhol.” Amazingly, this well-observed tradition by the people of Southern Iraq is, in fact, the Babylonian New Year, the Akitu Festival!

HAPPY NEW YEAR

Akitu Festival

Akitu: the Babylonian New year’s festival, celebrated to honor the supreme god Marduk, his crown prince Nabû and other gods.

The name Akitu is very ancient. In the third millennium BCE, the Sumerian population of southern Mesopotamia celebrated the á-ki-ti-še-gur₁₀-ku₅, the festival of the sowing of barley. It was celebrated in the first month of the year, that is in March/April. In the Babylonian calendar, this month was known as Nisannu (and in the modern Jewish calendar is still called Nisan). Since the festival was celebrated on the first days of the Babylonian year, we can call it a New Year’s festival. In fact, the ancient Babylonians already called it rêš šattim, ‘beginning of the year’.

The festival -better: conglomerate of festivities- was celebrated on two locations in Babylon: in the temple of the supreme god Marduk, the Esagila, and the ‘house of the New year’ which was situated north of the city. The two gods who were in the center of the festival were Nabû and his father, the supreme god Marduk, who was in the first millennium BCE usually called ‘Bêl’, Lord, because his real name was considered too holy to be pronounced.

On 4 Nisannu, the high priest of the Esagila (šešgallu) opened the festival, saying that the new year had begun. To the populace, this meant the beginning of a holiday of a week. On the same day, the king went to the temple of Nabû, where the high priest gave him the royal scepter. He then traveled to Borsippa, a city 17 kilometers downstream from Babylon that had a famous Nabû temple. Here, he spent the night. At the same time, the šešgallu recited the Babylonian creation epic (Enûma eliš) in the house of the New Year.

The fifth of Nisannu saw the king’s return to Babylon, accompanied by the statue of Nabû from Borsippa. The statue was left behind in the Uraš gate, and the king went to the Esagila to greet Marduk. He had to do this humbly, laying down his weapons, crown and scepter. The šešgallu listened to the king’s words that he had not sinned against Marduk and hit him very hard on the cheek (the king had to have tears in his eyes). Perhaps, this was a punishment for sins that were unwillingly committed. Kneeling in front of the statue of Marduk, the king receives an oracle about the glorious future, and was given back his royal insignia. At sunset, the king and the šešgallu performed a not completely understood ritual with a white bull.

Next day, the statue of Nabû visited the temple of Ninurta, where it defeated two enemies (in the form of golden statuettes). Then, it continued to the Esagila, where it joined Marduk’s statue. At the same time, other statues of other gods arrived at Babylon.

On 7 Nisannu, the statues were cleaned and received new dresses. On the next day, the festival reached its climax when all statues were brought out from their rooms and shown to the Babylonian populace. All gods were now present to honor Marduk, and their ‘parliament’ announced its policy for the next year. (One is reminded of the ’state of the union’ speech by the American president.) As far as we know, this policy was always one of blessing, fortune and success. After these joyful tidings, the gods started a tour through the city to the river. Here, they boarded a small fleet, that brought them to the house of the New year. The king himself guided the supreme god. On the last part of the route, the ships were placed on chariots, so that the gods were driven to the house of the New year in ships.

The people were singing all kinds of songs. Three of them can be reconstructed: a frivolous hymn to the goddess of sexuality and love Ištar, a song in which Marduk’s father Enlil was ridiculed as a god in the gutter, and an antiphonal hymn in which the gods were asked why they were not in their temples and replied that they had to be with Marduk.

What happened in the house of the New year on 9-10 Nisannu, is not known, but it seems that sacrifices were made by the king and that the spoils of war were presented to the gods. On 11 Nisannu, the gods returned to the Esagila, where they repeated their parliament. After this, they saw Nabû off, and went home.

The Akitu festival continued for centuries, and not only in Babylon. At the beginning of the third century CE, it was still celebated in Emessa in Syria, to honor the god Elagabal; the Roman emperor Heliogabalus (218-222) even introduced it in Italy.

Literature

K. van der Toorn, ‘Het Babylonische Nieuwjaarsfeest’ in Phoenix. Bulletin van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch genootschap Ex Oriente Lux 36/1 (1990) 10-29

Article by Jona Lendering

Source: www.livius.org

Brits turned Babylonia into Iraq… let’s fix this mistake!

Carve Up Iraq: Obsolete Borders and the Myth of Sovereignty

By Mark Fritz Mon Mar 17, 1:06 AM ET

Consider a country so fractured by regional and religious feuds that the most
efficient entities are the organized crime rings cashing in on the chaos.

This was the dilemma facing NATO negotiators when they met in Dayton, Ohio, in
1995 to stem the seemingly unstoppable bloodshed in Bosnia. The result was a
plan to simply slice up the place like a hard salami, to scoot the corrupt
combatants to their respective corners of the conflict.

It was idiotic, it was vilified, it was a surrender of the fundamental
principles of sovereignty. But, what the hell, it worked pretty well. It was as
complicated a case of carving up a contested area as Iraq, but it was inarguably
the only peace plan that, since the end of the Cold War, seriously succeeded,.

A few pundits have dismissed the idea of re-mapping Iraq, but they offer nothing
but lame alternatives to the seemingly unsolvable slog in which the Sitting Duck
president has put this country. Remember, if you will, that the Dayton Accords
were perhaps the most savagely ridiculed peace plan since the Vietnam War.
Critics called it either tactically stupid, or an appallingly unethical solution
that would sanctify boundaries already written in blood by sectarian fighting.
It was, they said, the capitulation to what we used to call ethnic cleansing.

Yet the result was a boon to the innocent, the vast majority without an agenda,
the regular folks who could finally stop running and, therefore, dying. The kind
of folks that many of our U.S. troops, as I have seen firsthand, have mistreated
people they were supposed to protect.

So, concentrate the troops on patrolling the newly carved borders. Slice Sadr
City from Baghdad, cede the Sunni west-central and northern areas to the Sunnis,
sanctify the south for the Shiites, give the Kuds the Kurdistan in the north
just as they were promised after World War I. Then, they can have their own
little playground to wage civil war.

Why not? The British colonists drew their own random geometry to recreate once
was Babylonia, but is now called Iraq, which (less face it) does have a historic
claim to the portly pashas in overpaid Kuwait.

Sure, partitioning Iraq seems far-fetched, but less so than John McCain vowing
a century of war to make peace. Huh? Think back a scant decade: peace
prospects in Bosnia were no less daunting. As a reporter who covered that
conflict and most of the others of the era, even I thought it was futile. I also remember seeing it in action. After NATO-led Western allies concentrated 60,000 troops on policing these
boundaries — instead of policing a country — I saw a war that had killed 95,000
people in the previous four years suddenly stop.

If there is any kind of consensus in the United States about Iraq, it’s that
American troops should be brought home as quickly as possible. Nobody can
agree — or grasp — an imaginative timetable that won’t result in something akin to
anarchy. But the general feeling is that some Western presence will probably be
necessary until the next decade, at best.

If the reason for toppling Saddam Hussein was idiotic at the outset, abandoning
the country could cost more innocent lives than those lost during the dictator’s
iron-fisted reign. (Which, nevertheless, was a grimly pragmatic counterweight to
the mullahs in Iran, not to mention the United States’ brutal allies in
Pakistan, Egypt, even Mauritania).

The argument that borders are sacred was blown to bits not only at the end of
the Cold War, but the two world wars and colonial whims that preceded it. Yet
the most compelling — if overlooked — precedent came in 1991, in the aftermath
of the first U.S.-led incursion into Iraq. By voting to allow multinational
troops to stop Saddam from smothering a Kurd uprising that came in the wake of
his defeat by international forces in 1991, the United Nations essentially
embraced the fact that borders can be fluid things when all else fails. That
the United Nations could, indeed, sanction an intervention into a country when
one part was intent on destroying its rivals.

That decision, if nothing else, could provide enough precedent to encourage
other countries to take part in cleaning up the mess created by President Bush.
Why not spin Sadr City away from Baghdad? Cede the south to the Shiites? Give
the Kurds the defacto homeland they’ve been promised since the end of World War
I?

The key difference between partitioning Bosnia and divvying up Iraq? The
dumb-thug reputation of the United States created by George W., the most onerous
of his creepy legacies. Gone is the moral weight that the country needs to press
the factions in Iraq — and key players in the West and the Middle East — to stay in
a room until everyone agrees to a partition plan.

It will take a new chief executive and a union of allies to pull it off. The
new president inherits a mighty task in finding a reasonable solution to the
Iraq quagmire, but the right amount of charm, arm-twisting and diplomacy could bring nations with a stake in this crisis to pitch in. If not, the alternative could be a cut-and-run
strategy that left Somalia the perfect model of a failed state.

In the last generation alone, so many borders have shifted that an endless
succession of ethnic groups could lay claim to almost any swath of real estate.
The roughly 4.4 million Iraqis who have fled — either to other countries, or to
strongholds of their own clans or clerics — could have their own autonomous
regions that many have already occupied. Many, if not most, have retreated to
their own corners of the conflict.

Tactically speaking, the U.S. troops and whatever allies the plan attracts could
concentrate mainly on maintaining the new borders, instead of chasing insurgents
from hotspot to hotspot.

Several years ago, I wrote a book about people uprooted by the end of the Cold
War, a period in which one in every 100 people had to flee their homes. “Maybe
the solution is to step in fast and break up the fight, rather than agonize over
how people can live together,” I argued. “Because maybe they can’t.”

Who knows? Maybe fencing off the factions could eventually consign old
animosities to the ether of history. Maybe, as has happened in Bosnia, those
internal boundaries will evolve into something more like stitches that keep a
wounded country together. Hell, maybe even long enough to heal without our
help.

Source: Yahoo! News

The surge is working! Now what’s next?

For the Iraq War’s Birthday, Slice the Cake
by Ivan Eland
3/18/2008

As the fifth anniversary of the United States’ second longest (next to Vietnam) and second costliest (next to World War II) war passes, the good news is that the counterinsurgency strategy of Gen. David Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno seems to be working. The bad news is that it will probably not save Iraq.

Although the U.S. troop surge has had some effect, it is probably not the most important factor damping violence back down to the levels of the middle of 2004. The United States had comparable force levels in Iraq (around 155,000 troops) in 2005, but the mayhem was worse than now and was increasing. Furthermore, the carnage in Iraq started dropping even before the United States began the surge (and temporarily increased again as U.S. troops were being added). In part, prior ethnic cleansing that had more cleanly separated hostile Shi’ite and Sunni populations has likely caused the reduction. Even more important was probably Petraeus’ and Odierno’s exploitation of the fissure between mainline Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda in Iraq.

The blindingly incompetent slaughter of fellow Muslim civilians by al-Qaeda in Iraq, which brought rebuke even by al-Qaeda’s central leadership, caused Sunni insurgents to get fed up and turn against the group. Petraeus and Odierno cleverly exploited this fissure by driving a wedge between the two factions. Although guerrilla operations are the most successful form of warfare in human history, and counterinsurgency forces seldom win over the long-term, they do best when they can divide the rebel movement. The United States was able to defeat the Greek communist insurgents during the 1947-1949 period and Filipino rebels from 1900 to 1902 by splitting the insurgencies. In the latter case, the United States was able to convince Emilio Aguinaldo, the most prominent rebel commander – perhaps by a cash payment – to surrender his forces. In Iraq, the United States is now essentially paying off former Sunni guerrillas in the “Awakening Councils” by funding, equipping, and training them to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq and working with the formerly hostile Shi’ite Mahdi militia.

Although this strategy has merits by attenuating violence in the short-term, it likely will exacerbate Iraq’s larger problems, thus eventually leading to a full-blown civil war. The Petraeus and Odierno strategy makes sense if the objective is to keep a lid on the violence until President Bush leaves office. When the tar baby is successfully passed on to the next president, Bush can then re-run the Kissinger argument from Vietnam. That argument goes something like this: “The United States would have won the Vietnam War if the Democratic Congress hadn’t cut off funding for it.” In Iraq, the similar Bush administration refrain will be: “The situation in Iraq was improving until we left office and handed over the power to President X.”

But Bush’s short-term strategy would likely aggravate Iraq’s central underlying problem – ethno-sectarian hostility. Had the Bush administration made a serious effort to consult experts on the Arab world before invading Iraq, it would have discovered that the country was one of the most fractured in the Arab world, and would be one of the least likely to support and sustain a liberal democratic federation. Prior to supporting former Sunni guerrillas, the administration was only funding, equipping, and training two sides – the Kurds and Shia – in the ongoing civil war. Now the administration is supporting all three sides. The Shi’ite/Kurdish-controlled government is opposed to the U.S. program to support the Sunnis and has been reluctant to let them into the security forces.

Such deep, underlying ethno-sectarian suspicions and fissures have been around for centuries in what is now Iraq and are unlikely to be rectified by passing a few benchmark laws. Given the history of Iraq – in which one group controlled the central government and oppressed the other groups – all groups, even including the formerly ruling Sunnis, are suspicious of central authority and will fight for control of it. Thus, societal cooperation, of which Iraq has little, must precede legislation – or the laws will be disregarded. Even less credibility will accrue to laws passed under pressure from an outside occupying power.

The only way the United States can pull its finger out of the dike without the dam crashing down is to use the threat of withdrawal – pulling the backstop out from the corrupt Shi’ite/Kurdish government – to get the Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds to agree to formally decentralize the country. If the central government has only limited power, the groups would fear its potential oppression less and attenuate their fight for control of it. In a decentralized, loosely confederated Iraq, their militias could provide security over members of their own groups in new autonomous regions (the country would probably have three or more of these regions based on ethno-sectarian or tribal affiliation). Also, judicial, resource (oil) management, and most other government functions could reside at the regional level. The central government would be responsible only for diplomatic representation overseas and negotiation of trade agreements with other countries and among regions.

Heretofore, the major sticking point in getting the three groups to support such a decentralization scheme was Sunni worries about meager oil resources in their region. The Kurds have had a de facto state in northern Iraq since the end of the Persian Gulf in 1991. Many Shi’ite leaders also favor setting up an autonomous region, the possibility of which is guaranteed in Iraq’s constitution. Even the Sunnis, finally disabused of the fantasy that they are strong enough to once again rule all of Iraq, and having tasted oppression at the hands of the Shi’i-dominated security forces, are becoming more favorable to decentralization.

To push the Shi’ite/Kurdish-dominated Iraqi government into gerrymandering regional borders – giving territory containing oil to the Sunnis to ensure their acceptance of decentralization – any new U.S. president must establish a timetable for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces, which prop up that dysfunctional government.

Because the Shia have roughly 60 percent of the oil and about 60 percent of the population, the only border that might need to be gerrymandered is near the northern oil fields by Kirkuk between Kurdistan (about 20 percent of the population and approximately 40 percent of the oil) and Sunni-dominated areas (roughly 20 percent of the population and little oil).

The historical record on partitions illuminates do’s and don’ts for any soft partition of Iraq into a loose confederation – the most important of which is that the Iraqis must do the dividing themselves for it to have crucial legitimacy in their eyes. In 1947, in partitioning India and Pakistan, Britain found out the hard way that the location of the partition line is vitally important and that an outside power drawing such a border arbitrarily can have disastrous and violent consequences.

Thus, the United States should avoid getting involved in the details of creating borders between regions, but some general lessons can be learned from past partitions. First, regional boundaries don’t have to exactly mirror ethno-sectarian areas, but they should come as close as possible. The case of Northern Ireland shows that a large minority (Catholics), which could be perceived as a threat by the majority (Protestants), should not be stranded on the other side of the borderline. A small minority on the other side of the line will probably experience little violence (Protestants in Ireland). Second, the case of Kosovo demonstrates that boundaries must consider ethno-sectarian or tribal shrines and sites. Third, although drawing borders along ethno-sectarian divides should minimize population movements, some migration will likely be necessary. Such movements must be voluntary; can be encouraged through incentives; and must be protected (as the violence in India-Pakistan in 1947 showed).

Although a U.S. withdrawal and soft partition is not a perfect solution, Iraq is in some sense already partitioned, with forces primarily loyal to ethno-sectarian groups providing security. U.S. policy training of such armed organizations is merely reinforcing this de facto partition. Such an unratified partition is very dangerous and will likely lead to a full-blown civil war. Only a new American president signaling a rapid U.S. withdrawal could motivate the parties to formalize, adjust, and make permanent the decentralized Iraq that already exists.

Source: www.antiwar.com

Here comes the South! Federalism in Southern Iraq

Changes in Iraq: The Shiite Kings

The Arbil-Baghdad flight was exciting as ever, chaotic, cramped and crowded. But fun. Our flight was delayed – about half a day – which is part of the fun. Except that is for the fact that we had meetings slated for the afternoon. We were expected to check into our hotel and then get across to Amar Al Hakim, son of His Eminence Abdulaziz Al Hakim, by 4 pm. Time to state the obvious: Iraq is divided into seven key power blocks. It is provocative putting this sort of thing on paper because you risk offending everyone, especially as many of those named below will read these notes. But we may as well be honest and put things down as we see them – if only to give you something to disagree with. So the power blocks are:
Barzani Iraq comprising the two KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) provinces of Arbil and Suleimaniyeh, i.e. half of Kurdistan (plus areas under Kurdish hegemony or protection like the Ninevah Plane).
Talabani Iraq comprising the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) province of Suleimaniyeh and (effectively and de facto) the troubled Kirkuk region.
Hakim Iraq comprising the main swathe of Southern Iraq including all the principal holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala.
Sadr Iraq comprising Sadr City (formerly known as Al Thawra) which amounts to all East Baghdad – plus a patchwork of toeholds here and there, plus loyal followers across the land, mostly male Shiites under thirty.
Anglo-American and Iraq Government administered Iraq comprising Basrah and Baghdad airports, Camp Fallujah, and the famous “International Zone” a.k.a. the Green Zone plus various toeholds here and there.
The disparate Sunni Sheikhs’ Iraq comprising towns like Fallujah and Takrit and various others in the “Sunni Triangle”.
Mafia police / insurgent controlled Iraq comprising towns like Mosul and Basrah that still remain in utter disorder and complete anarchy of the most horrendously terrifying kind.
For political purposes the first three of the above are key in today’s Iraq. Numbers one and two have sort of amalgamated to form the Kurdish Regional Government under a deal whereby Nechirvan Barzani is Premier of Kurdistan and Jalal Talabani takes the Presidency of Iraq. They have in turn made an alliance with number three – Abdulaziz Al Hakim – creating a power block of sufficient strength to effectively appoint the government of Iraq. At present they back the current Premier, Mr Malaki of the Dawa Party. But Mr Malaki has not pleased anyone lately so his future is not clear. More of that later.
So we landed in Baghdad and we were late. And I mean really late for our meeting with Amar Al Hakim which is worrying because he is important to us. We first met his father through an introduction from Mr Ali al Bayati, Counsellor at the Iraq embassy in London. And we believe that this is a family that really matters in today’s Iraq.
They say Baghdad is better, more secure but we are not about to go romping down the “road of death” from the airport to the city without escort. We are met by a friend from the K.R.G. Prime Minister’s office and given a number to phone. “Yes” they say and tell us to wait twenty minutes, then another twenty minutes, and another.
At last they came – a whacking great convoy of security boys, mercenaries. This particular bunch were Australians. They were very professional. Overly so if anything. I can’t say anything against these particular boys – I was very grateful to see them. But by and large with one or two notable exceptions like Mark Berger and the crew from Babylon Gates / Alfa Gates whom we often see in Baghdad / Arbil (they are the nice guys in the security business) – most of these characters are dangerous indeed. We have been driven off the road by them in the past – and they can be scary – get in their way and you are dead. Our advice to many putative leaders of Iraq has been to expel the worst of the mercenaries, security firms and the other tough guys from Iraq. They only serve to foster the insurgency by their actions and getting rid of them would be a really good populist measure.
But these guys are – as it turns out, pretty good – nice even. Their outfit was Falcon Security which is Kurdish owned. We were very late though. Hakim’s people are nervous that we will come during prayers. I told them not to worry – we wouldn’t go to the hotel – we’d go straight to them. This caused a minor rebellion amongst our own party but they concede to the inevitable graciously.
It is well after dark and after prayer time when we finally got to Hakkim’s compound. Hakkim’s people agreed to take us on to our hotel so we abandoned our security at that point. We were greeted by the affable Mr Haithem al Husseini, the family’s chief of protocol, and taken through to meet Amar Al Hakim. The young man in the black robes and black turban has a beaming face. We took an instant liking to this, the principal scion of the most powerful family in Iraq.

Amar Al-Hakim
Without Ambassador Hambley meetings like this would be impossible. His Arabic is exquisite, whereas mine is crudely rudimentary. Note that the following conversation was in beautiful classical Arabic, translated simultaneously and at speed in hushed whispers and this record may therefore be imperfect. Nevertheless it is a fair approximation of what was said. I asked the first question once Mark had conducted the formal greeting. I asked about the success or failure of the democratic experiment that is today’s Iraq. Is it sustainable should the Americans withdraw within the next year or two? Amar Al-Hakim answers at length:
“This is a deep question. We used to be so optimistic, even in the hard times. That was how we read things. There were those who opposed progress. But five key conditions for success were there:
A wise leadership
A populace that understood what mattered.
The presence of an international security force
Oil wealth
A political program with potential
“If those points represented the conditions for success, those existed. What we suffer from is a lack of trust or confidence. Because of this some Iraqis have been dragged towards sedition, to serving the agenda of outsiders. The Iraqi people had never been embroiled in a sectarian conflict throughout their long history. Indeed we were a nation in which mixed marriage, let alone mixed trade, was commonplace.
“We believed the democratic experiment represented the mystery ingredient that would deliver conditions of stability, not just to ourselves but to some of our neighbouring countries. We believed that the figures that surfaced because of the democratic experiment would, inevitably, be credible leaders, people whom the populace could trust. Indeed many of the problems of the region were assumed to be because of the failure to undertake a proper democratic experiment. We believed that democracy in Iraq and elsewhere could bring regional stability.
“However the relationship between Iraq and its neighbours in the region did not progress in the way it should have. Part of the blame must be placed at the door of the Iraqi people. We were too busy with our own internal problems to notice what was going on around us. The other part of the blame must be shouldered by our dear Arab neighbours who were not ready to be open in dealing with the political reality of a new Iraq. I believe that many of our problems were fermented regionally, which is not in the interests of our people.
“The presence of the multi-national forces added another dimension.
“Now a new political reality is overpowering these problems. The sectarian tension is being reduced. Iraq is being opened more to the countries of the region and to international society in general. Secondary education is developing gradually. The financial conditions of the people are improving steadily. Some might like to call this the economic development of the nation but I prefer to call it the “Financial Development” of Iraq because we will have economic development when the economic infrastructure of Iraq is rebuilt, and we do not have that at the moment.
“Iraq will get more wealth as the price of oil increases and as we raise the ceiling on Iraq’s oil production. Our budget for 2007 was $41 billion – the highest Iraq as a state has ever witnessed. In 2008 it will be 46 billion dollars. Plus you should add the budget that was under spent last year. So we face financial improvement. There are other good signs. Across the nation as a whole power production is up to a level that is higher than that achieved by the previous government. Infrastructure in general is improving; there is more pure water. There are many strategic projects underway now, though they may take a year or two to complete.
“The improvement in the proposed hydrocarbon law means the potential development of our oil resources – and the increased income can be used on development.
“But on the political level we need more action. There are many projects currently being held up in the Iraqi parliament. Some of the objections to these may be political rather than technical. Politicians are too busy evaluating the intentions of those involved in promoting these laws rather than getting on with evaluating the value of the laws themselves. Others argue about minor technicalities which could easily be resolved by negotiation. We believe it is in the interests of the country to approve the legislation currently before parliament. It is less harmful than quibbling about small details.
“Some people put these delays down to the mysterious way in which the central government communicates with the regions. We have taken a great step forward by preparing the revised drafts of these laws. We should now advance and not stop because of mere details.
“We regret the absence of key components in the current cabinet (the absence of key Sunni participation). The government tried to pass a lot of positive messages (to the Sunni politicians who left the government). We are working to have the participation of this important element. We give priority to elected representation but if they insist not to participate we have some capable people to take their place (note that Allawi’s faction has just been invited back to Baghdad and offered three cabinet posts – negotiations are underway at present).
“The Iraqi problems have been exaggerated by some of the international media. We have seen many media people. The media in Kurdistan are more respectful of the reality. Sure our media here in Baghdad has its strong points – and also in the provinces – but the media is not really as capable as it should be. And the problem is that the international world just reads the accidents page – the catastrophes – not the other pages. Inflation was 60%. Now it’s down to 16%. Unemployment was 50%. Now it’s down to 19%. These are big numbers and we can’t make the outside world hear.
“On reconciliation, the warm welcome we got in Ramadi when we visited them was as heart-warming as that we get when we visit the South. Yesterday we received a delegation from Ramadi. We think that reconciliation is rather more than merely signing an agreement.”

Iran
We asked Amar about Iran’s influence in Iraq. Is it excessive. We suggested that there were too many missions to Iran, too few, for instance, to Saudi Arabia.
Amar said that was not the case. “Indeed we are happy for closer contact with Saudi Arabia. We defend our own national security. We have Iraqi security. Iran is helpful. But some international elements have a problem with Iran. Does that impact the Iranian role? Iraq is a sovereign country. We do not accept interference from anyone.”

Sunni participation
What is your commitment to a federal Iraq with Sunni participation, we asked? The Sunnis do not like the idea of a federated Iraq.
“I don’t agree that all Sunnis do not like a federal Iraq. Tariq Al Hashemi (General Secretary of the Iraq Islamic Party and one of the two Vice-Presidents of Iraq – a Sunni) says his mind accepts federalism but not his heart.
“But federalism is a principal mentioned in the constitution and the federal system is a constitutional fact. The committee formed to study the constitution never mentioned federalism as being a problem.”

The Sadrists
We asked about relationships between the Sadrists and the Hakim family.
“Some of the people say the Hakim family want to rule. There is a tension between the Sadrists and the Supreme Council (the political grouping backed by the Hakim family). There was an agreement between the Supreme Council and the Sadrists but the Sadrists continue to have problems with the authorities in places like Kerbala and in Diwaniya province.”

Democracy versus instability
We asked about the commitment to democracy. Who should lead Iraq? Will there be provincial elections?
“Those who decide, decide. It is not a question of our wishes. We don’t think all the people will vote for one person. In the previous elections the people got to vote for more than one person. Even if the Supreme Council wish to promote a particular agenda – we should get into the political system to do so. As regards the struggle with the Sadrists, we believe the government is chasing any of them who stand outside the law. We differentiate between the Supreme Council as a political entity and others. The Sadrists are against violations of the law – but people claiming to be from the Sadrists have been causing trouble. If a chief of police stands against the violation of the law, will anyone say that police chief is from one faction and the outlaw from another? (a reference to the problem of many police units being run by outlaw and / or insurgent bands).
“Kerbala witnesses tension. So too Sadr City (East Baghdad). So too Basrah. But the Supreme Council is not administering these cities. This is not a struggle between political entities. Half of Diwaniya province is controlled by gangsters. This kind of thing does not happen in other countries. This is unacceptable anywhere else in the world. In France for example when extremists burnt cars, the police faced these outlaws firmly. This is the task the Governors must undertake here in Iraq.”
A question was asked about whether Al Qaidah was strong in Iraq (Al Qaidah in Iraq is a generic term used by Westerners to apply to a variety of militant insurgent groups in Iraq).
“In Western areas in Anbar Province they have had good results chasing Al Qaidah. We went there and congratulated them. But in Baghdad we have a mixed population and some elements are armed and in those areas the police are asked to leave. How come those armed groups come from one sect? Why ask the police to withdraw? (a reference to the US sponsored Sunni militias or “neighbourhood watch” groups). Many who have joined these groups (the new Western backed local militias) had committed violations before. Their backgrounds should be checked. They say more than 50,000 have been recruited and given badges. We should add them all to the police and army after checking their backgrounds.”

More on relationships with Iran
Were relationships with Iran too close we again asked? Should there not be more delegations to other neighboring countries?
“There are not weekly – or even monthly delegations to Iran. From time to time there are visits. As for our visits to Saudi Arabia, we are not really received properly. When we were in opposition we were received by their intelligence people. Now we are in power we would hope to have a proper reception in countries like Saudi Arabia. Maybe their circumstances do not allow that. We stopped our visits because we have to keep the dignity of our people. This kind of reaction is not invariable. In Kuwait we are received by the Amir. In Jordan by the King. In the UAE our reception is good. But we can understand the feelings of our brothers. Iraq will still keep the Arabic nations as her friends. Saudi Arabia is very important to us. During an official visit by His Eminence Abdul Aziz al Hakim (Amar’s father and the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council) he met with the king. We are ready to strengthen relations. But we believe their circumstances will not allow them to continue proper meetings at the highest level.

Source: Second Foundation

 

The Nineveh Plain: federal region for Iraqi Christians?

US Ambassador Ryan Crocker Affirms Significance of Art. 125 for Iraqi Minorities

Posted GMT 2-22-2008 20:46:9

Washington — In late 2007 US Ambassador Ryan Crocker affirmed the significance of Art. 125 for Iraq’s developing system of federalism, when responding to questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about minorities and their goal for a federal unit in the Nineveh Plain.

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked about the political viability and response of the Iraqi government to the Art. 125/Nineveh Plain solution for minorities. Sen. Biden prefaced his question to Amb. Crocker stating, “Some Iraqi parliamentarians have called for the creation of an autonomous region in the Nineveh Plains, home to a disproportionate number of Iraqi minorities, including Assyrians, Turkmen and Yazidis.”

Amb. Crocker’s response was clear-cut, writing that, “Some Iraqi parliamentarians and local politicians in Ninawa have called for an autonomous region in Ninawa province, citing Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution. Iraqi citizens can pursue the creation of a separate administrative region through processes consistent with this article.”

“Senator Joseph Biden’s committee is clearly investigating issues of federalism in Iraq that includes accounting for minorities, specifically Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriacs among others. Amb Ryan Crocker’s affirmation that politicians in Ninawa are trying to advance this agenda is a reflection of their success in profiling this goal”, said ISDP’s Project Director, Michael Youash.

The Iraqi Minorities Council, comprising an array of Iraq’s most vulnerable minorities, chaired by Dr. Hunain Al-Qaddo, is a strong voice for the creation of such a unit. The Assyrian Democratic Movement was the first to champion this idea, but now virtually all other Iraqi-based minority political groups are actively pursuing this agenda.

Through meetings, proposals, and constant communication with relevant government officials, ISDP is working with Iraqi partners promoting the Art. 125/Nineveh Plain solution. ISDP sees clearly that the goal of these minorities is a stronger more integrated Iraq, through federalism. The goal is true decentralization without partition, which the minority peoples overwhelmingly support.

“Some question the Art. 125 solution on the basis of misunderstandings of its significance in relation to Iraq’s developing federal system. Amb. Ryan Crocker’s response puts any doubts to rest. ISDP is working to ensure that senior-most US decision-makers are being equipped to deal with matters most vital to the survival of minorities in their homeland; the establishment of the Nineveh Plain Administrative Unit in accordance with Art. 125 of the Iraqi Constitution is a central part of that mission”, said Youash.

Source: Assyrian International News Agency

Kosovo and Iraq

Breaking free

By Thomas Wachtel

 

2/20/2008

One of my early political memories was the NATO action in Kosovo in 1999. That was when I, along with many other politically inclined youths, learned the name Slobodan Milosevic and what “ethnic cleansing” meant. We learned the difference between Serbs and Albanians. We learned that sometimes the world community needs to step in to stop a human disaster.

Sunday, the people whose “cleansing” was ended by NATO made the next big step in their journey. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia, formerly part of Yugoslavia.

On Monday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice formally recognized Kosovo’s new status, while trying to preserve relations with Serbi, who, along with its ally Russia, maintains that Kosovo is still a part of Serbia.

Though Kosovo’s independence might lead other breakaway groups, like the Basques in Spain and the Abkhazia in Georgia, the independence attempt is the right move for both the Kosovars and the Bush administration.

First of all, as Rice said, Kosovo has a fairly unique situation. The country from which it split, Serbia, was formerly part of Yugoslavia, which dissolved into several smaller states, therefore establishing a precedent for Kosovo to move for independence. The region’s history of ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Serbs helps contribute to the uniqueness of Kosovo’s situation, as does the fact that the region has been administered by the United Nations for nearly 10 years. These factors all make Kosovo a prime candidate for independence.

The independence of Kosovo also, in a circuitous way, bodes well for the future of Iraq after U.S. troops leave. One of the proposed plans for Iraq’s government has been a federal structure, with a central government connecting three states, one each for the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. If Kosovo, which is ethnically 90 percent Albanian, can survive in a similar format, perhaps the federalist plan could actually work for Iraq.

Of course, the declaration of independence isn’t uncontested. Serbia opposes it, and Serbia is allied with Russia. The two nations have refused to acknowledge Kosovo’s declaration. Of course, the United States has recognized Kosovo. This could lead to a nasty diplomatic situation between the U.S. and Russia if it is not handled properly.

Also, it’s well known that the Balkan Peninsula isn’t exactly the most stable region of the world. It’s possible that Kosovo’s independence could make the region unstable once again.

However, it seems that the pros for Kosovar independence outweigh the cons. The region has led a bloody history at the hands of its own government, so it seems only proper that it should be able to secede. Kosovo has a rough road ahead, but it has the right to make the decision to walk that road – and its people deserve our support.

Source: Indiana Daily Student

Shiites move towards federal region in the South

Iraqi Lawmakers Pass 3 Crucial, Long-Delayed Laws

By ALISSA J. RUBIN

Published: February 14, 2008

BAGHDAD — Using old-fashioned politicking behind the scenes, Iraq’s parliamentary leaders on Wednesday pushed through three divisive laws that had been held up for months by bitter maneuvering between factions and, recently, threats to dissolve the legislative body.

The three laws are the 2008 budget, a law outlining the scope of provincial powers — a crucial aspect of Iraq’s self-definition as a federal state — and an amnesty that will cover thousands of the detainees held in Iraqi jails. They were put to a vote as a single package.

“The Iraqi Parliament has approved the three laws, and this is the greatest achievement possible for the Iraqi people,” said Adnan al-Dulaimi, the Sunni lawmaker who leads the Iraqi Consensus Front.

Khalid al-Attiya, the deputy speaker and a Shiite, beamed as he told reporters right after the vote on Wednesday afternoon that the laws had passed unanimously.

Passage of the measures represents a significant achievement for the Parliament, which on many days could not muster a quorum. The approach of voting on the three laws together broke the logjam because it allowed every group to boast that it had won something. Leaders of the blocs — Shiite, Sunni and Kurd — realized that while no single law could pass on its own, together, the measures offered something for each political constituency. So factions would swallow the laws they liked least in order to get the one they wanted.

The Kurds wanted the budget in its current form, which guarantees their regional government 17 percent of the country’s revenues after subtracting the costs of federal ministries that serve the entire country, like foreign affairs and defense.

The Sunnis wanted the amnesty because about 80 percent of the more than 26,000 detainees in Iraqi jails are Sunnis. About half of all detainees have not been sentenced.

The Shiites want the provincial powers law because they want to be sure that substantial power rests in the hands of the provinces rather than in the central government.

After the laws are approved by the Presidency Council, in this case a formality since all of the political blocs agreed to their passage, they will be published. The particulars of the laws remained unclear in part because changes were made in the last minutes of the legislative process.

Embedded in each of the measures, however, are the same problems that created the controversy in the first place. For instance, on the budget, the debate over the size of the Kurdish share has merely been deferred for a year. The 17 percent agreement is only for this year; next year it will be renegotiated, and there is a strong push to reduce the Kurds’ share.

On the provincial powers law, which includes a requirement that elections for the provincial councils be held in the fall, there are serious problems with the commissions that set up and administer the elections both at the national and provincial levels, raising questions about whether the votes will be viewed as fair or will merely deepen divisions among the sects. Such worries could end up delaying the elections.

Left out of the political bargain are the newly formed Awakening Councils, which are predominantly Sunni and in many cases represent powerful tribes. Allied with the United States, they have taken the lead in fighting extremist Sunni groups. Now their leaders are clambering for a place at the table. They are outraged that the Iraqi Islamic Party, which is Sunni but has limited grass-roots support, dominates the provincial council in Anbar.

“In Anbar Province we want the provincial council disbanded and another one formed, we want elections to be held in March or April, and we want the Iraqi Islamic Party to leave the province in 30 days,” said Sheik Ali Hatem, one of the leaders of the Anbar Awakening, who survived a suicide bomb attack this week.

There appeared to be little chance of elections before the fall.

Abeer Mohammed contributed reporting.

Source: New York Times

 

Iraq Federal System Legislation Passes

Military.com | Senator Joe Biden Press Release | January 28, 2008

Washington, DC — The U.S. Senate passed legislation today, sponsored by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE) and Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), which calls for the United States to support a political settlement in Iraq based on a federal system of government.

The Biden-Brownback measure — which passed as part of the Department of Defense Conference report — has garnered overwhelming bipartisan support in both Houses of Congress and would require a major strategic shift in the Administration’s Iraq policy. President Bush vetoed the original Department of Defense Authorization report in December because of an unrelated issue that Congress subsequently addressed.

“We have both sides of the aisle, both sides of the U.S. Capitol, saying to the President: abandon this flawed strategy of yours in Iraq and change course. Everyone agrees that there is no pure military solution in Iraq. There has to be a political solution and that begs the question: what is it? Congress has again answered that question with one voice” said Senator Joe Biden.

In May of 2006, Senator Biden, along with President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations Leslie H. Gelb, announced a detailed plan for promoting a political settlement in Iraq that would allow our troops to leave, without leaving chaos behind. The plan called for a decentralized, federal system in Iraq, which would give its people local control over the fabric of their daily lives, including police, jobs, education and government services. A limited central government would be responsible for protecting Iraq’s borders and distributing its oil revenues.

The Biden-Brownback amendment was based on Senator Biden’s federalism plan for Iraq and is a product of his years-long effort working across the aisle to build support. During the Senate vote in September, Senator Biden’s plan secured the support of key leaders in the U.S. Senate from both parties, including Senate Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI), former Chairman John Warner (R-VA) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Richard Lugar (R-IN). The final vote in favor of the Biden-Brownback amendment was 75-23, including 26 Republicans.

“Simply put, absent an occupation we cannot sustain or a dictator we cannot support, Iraq cannot be governed from the center at this point in its history. Supporting a decentralized Iraq with strong local and regional governments and a limited central government is the only way we can end this war without leaving chaos behind,” added Senator Biden.

The Biden-Brownback amendment also had 15 cosponsors: Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Arlen Specter (R-PA), John Kerry (D-MA), Gordon Smith (R-OR), Bill Nelson (D-FL), Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) Harry Reid (D-NV), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Ken Salazar (D-CO) and Tom Carper (D-DE).

The Biden-Brownback amendment states that the United States should actively support a political settlement among Iraqis based on the provisions of Iraq’s constitution that call for creating a federal system of government, with strong regions and a limited central government. It also urged the administration to bring in the international community — including the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Iraq’s neighbors — to support a settlement based on federalism and to convene a conference with Iraqis to help them reach that settlement.

A few key facts about the Biden-Brownback amendment:

* The legislation does not tell Iraqis what to do. It speaks only to what U.S. policy should be.
* Federalism is not a U.S. or foreign imposition on Iraq. Iraq’s own constitution calls FOR a “decentralized, federal system” and sets out the powers of the regions (extensive) and those of the central government (limited). The Constitution also says that in case of conflict between regional and national law, regional law prevails.
* Federalism is not partition. In fact, it’s probably the only way to prevent partition or, even worse, the total fragmentation of Iraq.
* Federalism will not accelerate sectarian cleansing; it’s the only way to reverse it. Iraqis have already voted with their feet, with 4.5 million fleeing within Iraq or abroad. Unless Iraqis come to some kind of agreement on sharing power peacefully, the results of extensive cleansing will solidify and set the stage for future instability.

“When I (Biden) introduced the measure last year to bar permanent bases in Iraq, I was concerned that Iraqi suspicions about American aims in Iraq were endangering American lives. These misperceptions will not be easily changed, but this legislation again should help allay those suspicions and shows that the American people have no imperial designs upon Iraq,” said Senator Biden.

Senator Biden’s effort to protect our troops by ensuring that the Pentagon builds and deploys more mine resistant vehicles — which are proven to decrease deaths and injuries from roadside bombs by 67 to 80 percent — also was successful. The bill fully authorizes the $11.98 billion Senator Biden secured in the Defense Appropriations bill, which passed earlier this year.

“This allows the military to continue to produce and field MRAPS through the fall of 2008. Keeping the production lines open gives commanders on the ground the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing security environment. As long as one soldier or marine is in harm’s way, I will fight to get that soldier or marine the very best protection this nation has,” added Senator Biden.

Source: Military.com

 

Exit without chaos Biden calls for federalism, not partitioning for Iraq

By Jennifer Keefe

Friday, November 30, 2007

DOVER — Presidential hopeful Joe Biden says his plan for Iraq is the only way to exit the war-torn country without leaving chaos behind.

The Democratic senator from Delaware told Foster’s editorial board members Thursday that he understands what the American people need and considers this his time to correct the opportunities Bush has “squandered.”

Biden, who has served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for three decades, has been praised by his opponents for his Iraq plan, which calls for federalism, not a partition, to decentralize power and give the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis control over their daily lives by creating a central government to control border defense and distribution of oil revenues.

“(The plan) is unique to me,” he said, adding he garnered the support of 75 other senators.

When asked if he could really see a strong central government developing in the country, given the necessity of dividing up oil revenues, Biden answered in the straightforward manner he has addressed the public in the past.

“Absolutely not. There will be no strong central government in the lifetime of anyone in this room,” he said. “That’s why I came up with the federalism plan.”

Biden explained the Iraqi constitution essentially lays out how any governed areas in Iraq can choose to become regions, which are entitled to constitutions.

Those regions can then provide their own security, which would restrict federal police forces from that territory. The war in Iraq has dominated Biden’s campaign thus far, and he said Thursday he considers this election to be the “single most consequential any of you have ever voted in.”

He said he thinks the American people are looking for someone who they can trust to guide the country through what is going to be a “very difficult decade,” and pointed to security as one of the biggest issues pushing the election.

“It’s not only about our national security, but our economic security,” he said, adding both Democrats and Republicans have been cynical about what the American people are willing to endure regarding the war and the economy.

“We have to tell the American people what they need to hear and not what they want to hear,” he said. “You’ve got to trust the American people. You’ve got to level with them.”

In May, Biden was the only Democrat who voted to continue funding the troops, a vote that was met with great opposition. He said Thursday, however, that other candidates who voted to cut off funding in an effort to push Bush to end the war are now saying troops would remain in Iraq through their first term as president.

“How do you cut off funding for the troops and you’re going to keep them for the first term?” he asked.

Biden who has campaigned hard in Iowa — the first state to caucus — and New Hampshire, which holds the first primary, is trailing front-runners Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama and John Edwards.

Biden half-joked to the board, “I’ve thought more about what I’d do as president than how to get elected president and I’m trying to rectify that now,” but added that he doesn’t think the money Clinton and Obama are spending on their campaigns is bringing up their poll standings substantially.

His downplays suggestions that his educational plan is “almost identical” to Obama’s, saying that he has been talking about his for years.

His plan calls for starting children in school earlier, extending the school day, having smaller classes and providing higher wages for teachers, which would save money by decreasing teacher turnaround.

Toward the end of the editorial board meeting Biden said, “I am one of the few people who’s been able to take the divisive issues and get bipartisan support. There is not a single, solitary problem in this country that lends itself to a 51 percent solution.”

Source: Citizen.com

Biden: Iraqis and international community are ready for federalism

Biden Gives His Take on Iraq Policy, Pakistan, Campaigning in Iowa

Originally Aired: November 27, 2007

Interviewer Judy Woodruff

I’m the only one with a clear plan adopted by a majority of the foreign policy establishment, 75 senators. It took a long time, but I would argue that my participation in government has been not in sync with what the conventional wisdom was, but mostly out of sync and ahead of the majority of what the conventional wisdom was.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Your Iraq plan, you were out with it months ago. Essentially, you would separate Iraq into three ethnic divisions, in effect, Sunni, Shia and Kurd. There would be a weak central government.

The U.S. Senate has endorsed this. It’s got a number of fans here in the United States, but not so many fans in Iraq. How do you make it happen?

SEN. JOE BIDEN: Well, the way you make it happen — and, by the way, initially there weren’t many fans in Iraq, because the president called it partition. It’s not partition. It calls what their federal constitution calls for.

So I know most of these leaders. I met with Hashimi, the Sunni. I’ve met with the Shia, the Kurds. I’ve met with all these leaders. Every one of them now has gone on record as endorsing the plan, except for Sadr, the guy who has the Mahdi Army.

And so the way you make it work, I could tomorrow, were the president prepared to do it — look, we have — the military’s done a very good job in this surge. No one ever doubted that. But now the opportunity presents itself, what do you do with this better condition?

Now is the time for the president to call in, as I’ve recommended, the international community, get an international conference on Iraq sponsored by the big five countries. Bring in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey. Bring them in and get them an agreement on a federal system inside Iraq.

This is the time to do it. We could do it right now. The Iraqis are ready for it. The international community is ready for it. And I believe, with the leadership of the permanent five in the United Nations, we could get this done.

But the president continues to cling, Judy, to this notion that we can have a strong central government, a shared power, that they’re going to — all the Iraqis are going to trust. And it won’t happen.

U.S. Policy in Iraq

JUDY WOODRUFF: But with this recent reduction in violence on the heels of the surge of U.S. troops, is that not a reason to rethink not just U.S. policy, but your plan?

SEN. JOE BIDEN: Oh, no.

JUDY WOODRUFF: Is that such a new factor here that…

SEN. JOE BIDEN: No, what it does, it really — no one ever doubted that the military would do their job. Now it’s time for the president to do his. Now there’s a little breathing room, and the president is doing nothing.

The number-two man in the military in Iraq, general, says there’s a very short window here, a small window. We see no progress on the part of the Iraqis reconciling their differences.

So, Judy, once this surge is lifted, once we stop, they’re going to go back to the civil war again. This is the time the president has to say, “All right, here’s the deal. You voted for a constitution that says you are a loosely federated government. Go ahead and implement it. Implement it now. Get the rest of the world to bless it,” just like we did in Bosnia, just like we did with the Dayton peace accords, but it requires presidential leadership.

JUDY WOODRUFF: You’re on the record calling for U.S. troops, most of them, to be out of Iraq by the summer of 2008. Is that realistic, given the…

SEN. JOE BIDEN: The president is making it less realistic because he isn’t acting on the political side. It is realistic if, in fact, we get a political settlement. Why are we there? We’re there as a referee in the midst of a civil war. That’s why we’re there. If we left tomorrow, everybody says, “What would happen?” The Sunnis and Shias would start killing each other again.

So if you’re going to be able to leave without leaving chaos behind, you’ve got to leave in a circumstance where the Sunnis and Shias have worked out a deal that they’re not going to kill each other. How do you do that? You do that by going forward with the Biden-Gelb plan, which has gotten so much support, and say, “Hey, take your militia and make them your local army. Have a central government that controls the army and the resources, but doesn’t tell you what kind of laws you have to have relative to education in your community.”

JUDY WOODRUFF: And you’re saying, if you were elected president, you could make this happen?

SEN. JOE BIDEN: I guarantee you we could make it happen.

Source: PBS.org