Here comes the South! Federalism in Southern Iraq

Changes in Iraq: The Shiite Kings

The Arbil-Baghdad flight was exciting as ever, chaotic, cramped and crowded. But fun. Our flight was delayed – about half a day – which is part of the fun. Except that is for the fact that we had meetings slated for the afternoon. We were expected to check into our hotel and then get across to Amar Al Hakim, son of His Eminence Abdulaziz Al Hakim, by 4 pm. Time to state the obvious: Iraq is divided into seven key power blocks. It is provocative putting this sort of thing on paper because you risk offending everyone, especially as many of those named below will read these notes. But we may as well be honest and put things down as we see them – if only to give you something to disagree with. So the power blocks are:
Barzani Iraq comprising the two KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) provinces of Arbil and Suleimaniyeh, i.e. half of Kurdistan (plus areas under Kurdish hegemony or protection like the Ninevah Plane).
Talabani Iraq comprising the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) province of Suleimaniyeh and (effectively and de facto) the troubled Kirkuk region.
Hakim Iraq comprising the main swathe of Southern Iraq including all the principal holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala.
Sadr Iraq comprising Sadr City (formerly known as Al Thawra) which amounts to all East Baghdad – plus a patchwork of toeholds here and there, plus loyal followers across the land, mostly male Shiites under thirty.
Anglo-American and Iraq Government administered Iraq comprising Basrah and Baghdad airports, Camp Fallujah, and the famous “International Zone” a.k.a. the Green Zone plus various toeholds here and there.
The disparate Sunni Sheikhs’ Iraq comprising towns like Fallujah and Takrit and various others in the “Sunni Triangle”.
Mafia police / insurgent controlled Iraq comprising towns like Mosul and Basrah that still remain in utter disorder and complete anarchy of the most horrendously terrifying kind.
For political purposes the first three of the above are key in today’s Iraq. Numbers one and two have sort of amalgamated to form the Kurdish Regional Government under a deal whereby Nechirvan Barzani is Premier of Kurdistan and Jalal Talabani takes the Presidency of Iraq. They have in turn made an alliance with number three – Abdulaziz Al Hakim – creating a power block of sufficient strength to effectively appoint the government of Iraq. At present they back the current Premier, Mr Malaki of the Dawa Party. But Mr Malaki has not pleased anyone lately so his future is not clear. More of that later.
So we landed in Baghdad and we were late. And I mean really late for our meeting with Amar Al Hakim which is worrying because he is important to us. We first met his father through an introduction from Mr Ali al Bayati, Counsellor at the Iraq embassy in London. And we believe that this is a family that really matters in today’s Iraq.
They say Baghdad is better, more secure but we are not about to go romping down the “road of death” from the airport to the city without escort. We are met by a friend from the K.R.G. Prime Minister’s office and given a number to phone. “Yes” they say and tell us to wait twenty minutes, then another twenty minutes, and another.
At last they came – a whacking great convoy of security boys, mercenaries. This particular bunch were Australians. They were very professional. Overly so if anything. I can’t say anything against these particular boys – I was very grateful to see them. But by and large with one or two notable exceptions like Mark Berger and the crew from Babylon Gates / Alfa Gates whom we often see in Baghdad / Arbil (they are the nice guys in the security business) – most of these characters are dangerous indeed. We have been driven off the road by them in the past – and they can be scary – get in their way and you are dead. Our advice to many putative leaders of Iraq has been to expel the worst of the mercenaries, security firms and the other tough guys from Iraq. They only serve to foster the insurgency by their actions and getting rid of them would be a really good populist measure.
But these guys are – as it turns out, pretty good – nice even. Their outfit was Falcon Security which is Kurdish owned. We were very late though. Hakim’s people are nervous that we will come during prayers. I told them not to worry – we wouldn’t go to the hotel – we’d go straight to them. This caused a minor rebellion amongst our own party but they concede to the inevitable graciously.
It is well after dark and after prayer time when we finally got to Hakkim’s compound. Hakkim’s people agreed to take us on to our hotel so we abandoned our security at that point. We were greeted by the affable Mr Haithem al Husseini, the family’s chief of protocol, and taken through to meet Amar Al Hakim. The young man in the black robes and black turban has a beaming face. We took an instant liking to this, the principal scion of the most powerful family in Iraq.

Amar Al-Hakim
Without Ambassador Hambley meetings like this would be impossible. His Arabic is exquisite, whereas mine is crudely rudimentary. Note that the following conversation was in beautiful classical Arabic, translated simultaneously and at speed in hushed whispers and this record may therefore be imperfect. Nevertheless it is a fair approximation of what was said. I asked the first question once Mark had conducted the formal greeting. I asked about the success or failure of the democratic experiment that is today’s Iraq. Is it sustainable should the Americans withdraw within the next year or two? Amar Al-Hakim answers at length:
“This is a deep question. We used to be so optimistic, even in the hard times. That was how we read things. There were those who opposed progress. But five key conditions for success were there:
A wise leadership
A populace that understood what mattered.
The presence of an international security force
Oil wealth
A political program with potential
“If those points represented the conditions for success, those existed. What we suffer from is a lack of trust or confidence. Because of this some Iraqis have been dragged towards sedition, to serving the agenda of outsiders. The Iraqi people had never been embroiled in a sectarian conflict throughout their long history. Indeed we were a nation in which mixed marriage, let alone mixed trade, was commonplace.
“We believed the democratic experiment represented the mystery ingredient that would deliver conditions of stability, not just to ourselves but to some of our neighbouring countries. We believed that the figures that surfaced because of the democratic experiment would, inevitably, be credible leaders, people whom the populace could trust. Indeed many of the problems of the region were assumed to be because of the failure to undertake a proper democratic experiment. We believed that democracy in Iraq and elsewhere could bring regional stability.
“However the relationship between Iraq and its neighbours in the region did not progress in the way it should have. Part of the blame must be placed at the door of the Iraqi people. We were too busy with our own internal problems to notice what was going on around us. The other part of the blame must be shouldered by our dear Arab neighbours who were not ready to be open in dealing with the political reality of a new Iraq. I believe that many of our problems were fermented regionally, which is not in the interests of our people.
“The presence of the multi-national forces added another dimension.
“Now a new political reality is overpowering these problems. The sectarian tension is being reduced. Iraq is being opened more to the countries of the region and to international society in general. Secondary education is developing gradually. The financial conditions of the people are improving steadily. Some might like to call this the economic development of the nation but I prefer to call it the “Financial Development” of Iraq because we will have economic development when the economic infrastructure of Iraq is rebuilt, and we do not have that at the moment.
“Iraq will get more wealth as the price of oil increases and as we raise the ceiling on Iraq’s oil production. Our budget for 2007 was $41 billion – the highest Iraq as a state has ever witnessed. In 2008 it will be 46 billion dollars. Plus you should add the budget that was under spent last year. So we face financial improvement. There are other good signs. Across the nation as a whole power production is up to a level that is higher than that achieved by the previous government. Infrastructure in general is improving; there is more pure water. There are many strategic projects underway now, though they may take a year or two to complete.
“The improvement in the proposed hydrocarbon law means the potential development of our oil resources – and the increased income can be used on development.
“But on the political level we need more action. There are many projects currently being held up in the Iraqi parliament. Some of the objections to these may be political rather than technical. Politicians are too busy evaluating the intentions of those involved in promoting these laws rather than getting on with evaluating the value of the laws themselves. Others argue about minor technicalities which could easily be resolved by negotiation. We believe it is in the interests of the country to approve the legislation currently before parliament. It is less harmful than quibbling about small details.
“Some people put these delays down to the mysterious way in which the central government communicates with the regions. We have taken a great step forward by preparing the revised drafts of these laws. We should now advance and not stop because of mere details.
“We regret the absence of key components in the current cabinet (the absence of key Sunni participation). The government tried to pass a lot of positive messages (to the Sunni politicians who left the government). We are working to have the participation of this important element. We give priority to elected representation but if they insist not to participate we have some capable people to take their place (note that Allawi’s faction has just been invited back to Baghdad and offered three cabinet posts – negotiations are underway at present).
“The Iraqi problems have been exaggerated by some of the international media. We have seen many media people. The media in Kurdistan are more respectful of the reality. Sure our media here in Baghdad has its strong points – and also in the provinces – but the media is not really as capable as it should be. And the problem is that the international world just reads the accidents page – the catastrophes – not the other pages. Inflation was 60%. Now it’s down to 16%. Unemployment was 50%. Now it’s down to 19%. These are big numbers and we can’t make the outside world hear.
“On reconciliation, the warm welcome we got in Ramadi when we visited them was as heart-warming as that we get when we visit the South. Yesterday we received a delegation from Ramadi. We think that reconciliation is rather more than merely signing an agreement.”

Iran
We asked Amar about Iran’s influence in Iraq. Is it excessive. We suggested that there were too many missions to Iran, too few, for instance, to Saudi Arabia.
Amar said that was not the case. “Indeed we are happy for closer contact with Saudi Arabia. We defend our own national security. We have Iraqi security. Iran is helpful. But some international elements have a problem with Iran. Does that impact the Iranian role? Iraq is a sovereign country. We do not accept interference from anyone.”

Sunni participation
What is your commitment to a federal Iraq with Sunni participation, we asked? The Sunnis do not like the idea of a federated Iraq.
“I don’t agree that all Sunnis do not like a federal Iraq. Tariq Al Hashemi (General Secretary of the Iraq Islamic Party and one of the two Vice-Presidents of Iraq – a Sunni) says his mind accepts federalism but not his heart.
“But federalism is a principal mentioned in the constitution and the federal system is a constitutional fact. The committee formed to study the constitution never mentioned federalism as being a problem.”

The Sadrists
We asked about relationships between the Sadrists and the Hakim family.
“Some of the people say the Hakim family want to rule. There is a tension between the Sadrists and the Supreme Council (the political grouping backed by the Hakim family). There was an agreement between the Supreme Council and the Sadrists but the Sadrists continue to have problems with the authorities in places like Kerbala and in Diwaniya province.”

Democracy versus instability
We asked about the commitment to democracy. Who should lead Iraq? Will there be provincial elections?
“Those who decide, decide. It is not a question of our wishes. We don’t think all the people will vote for one person. In the previous elections the people got to vote for more than one person. Even if the Supreme Council wish to promote a particular agenda – we should get into the political system to do so. As regards the struggle with the Sadrists, we believe the government is chasing any of them who stand outside the law. We differentiate between the Supreme Council as a political entity and others. The Sadrists are against violations of the law – but people claiming to be from the Sadrists have been causing trouble. If a chief of police stands against the violation of the law, will anyone say that police chief is from one faction and the outlaw from another? (a reference to the problem of many police units being run by outlaw and / or insurgent bands).
“Kerbala witnesses tension. So too Sadr City (East Baghdad). So too Basrah. But the Supreme Council is not administering these cities. This is not a struggle between political entities. Half of Diwaniya province is controlled by gangsters. This kind of thing does not happen in other countries. This is unacceptable anywhere else in the world. In France for example when extremists burnt cars, the police faced these outlaws firmly. This is the task the Governors must undertake here in Iraq.”
A question was asked about whether Al Qaidah was strong in Iraq (Al Qaidah in Iraq is a generic term used by Westerners to apply to a variety of militant insurgent groups in Iraq).
“In Western areas in Anbar Province they have had good results chasing Al Qaidah. We went there and congratulated them. But in Baghdad we have a mixed population and some elements are armed and in those areas the police are asked to leave. How come those armed groups come from one sect? Why ask the police to withdraw? (a reference to the US sponsored Sunni militias or “neighbourhood watch” groups). Many who have joined these groups (the new Western backed local militias) had committed violations before. Their backgrounds should be checked. They say more than 50,000 have been recruited and given badges. We should add them all to the police and army after checking their backgrounds.”

More on relationships with Iran
Were relationships with Iran too close we again asked? Should there not be more delegations to other neighboring countries?
“There are not weekly – or even monthly delegations to Iran. From time to time there are visits. As for our visits to Saudi Arabia, we are not really received properly. When we were in opposition we were received by their intelligence people. Now we are in power we would hope to have a proper reception in countries like Saudi Arabia. Maybe their circumstances do not allow that. We stopped our visits because we have to keep the dignity of our people. This kind of reaction is not invariable. In Kuwait we are received by the Amir. In Jordan by the King. In the UAE our reception is good. But we can understand the feelings of our brothers. Iraq will still keep the Arabic nations as her friends. Saudi Arabia is very important to us. During an official visit by His Eminence Abdul Aziz al Hakim (Amar’s father and the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council) he met with the king. We are ready to strengthen relations. But we believe their circumstances will not allow them to continue proper meetings at the highest level.

Source: Second Foundation